Putin’s fakes about Ukrainian Army turn out true about his own

Here’s a tested observation: if you change the meaning of Putin’s statements to the opposite, you can understand what’s actually happening.

With this approach, it is interesting to listen to his statements about the Ukrainian Army. For example, on December 7, at a meeting with the “Human Rights Council,” Putin tried to respond to concerns voiced by ordinary Russians related to the interminable war with Ukraine.  

The Russian president said that “Ukrainians shoot servicemen in front of others for leaving combat positions. There is nothing like this in the Russian armed forces.” Applying our formula, we can assume that among the Russians themselves there are so many cases of executions for refusing to fight that even Putin is forced to publicly “reflect” on this problem. We can’t bur recall the show-off execution by a sledgehammer of a Wagner mercenary by his comrades-in-arms.

Putin also said that the reports about “camps” for deserters in Russia were “nonsense and fakes” and further dwelled on the topic: “There are no problems with desertion in the special operation, as fact s of abandoning combat positions are not of a mass nature.”

But we know: on December 6, one of the convicts, Pavel Nikolin, who had been sentenced for theft and robbery before he was dragged to fight in Ukraine, deserted, crossed the border carrying a machine gun, and shot police officers in Rostov region.

At this, there were repeated reports of prisons in the occupied territories in the East of Ukraine, where Russian soldiers were being held in inhumane conditions as punishment for refusing to fight. After all, facts of desertion are recorded quite often.

We can also recall how, after the initial Russian attack in 2014, a meme based on Russian propaganda appeared, referring to Ukrainian draftees: “they are being taken off trains and sent to fight in the ATO.” But already in 2022, the occupiers themselves ran a safari mobilization campaign in the occupied territories of Donetsk and Luhansk regions: men were hunted down like game, right off the streets, being forced to fight with the Ukrainian forces. At the same time, Russians even employed students for the war, “conscripting” youths right from university audirotia.

Thus, Russian fakes about the Armed Forces of Ukraine are a reflection of the real state of affairs in the Russian army and their own “sins.” Because it was the Russian military that turned out to be not some star movie “knights with unshakable moral principles,” but a mix of private and regional armed groups, blended with convicts. During the war, Russians demonstrated a lack of internal discipline, low motivation, and a rogue character that manifested itself in sadism and looting.

To hide this character, Russian propaganda opts to accuse its enemies of all conceivable and inconceivable sins.

Further, we will dwell on the fake reflective narratives that Putin’s propaganda constantly circulates.

Fake narrative 1. “Ukrainians don’t know how to fight”

Russians have always taken credit for all victories of the multinational imperial army, in the times of both tsars and general secretaries. The apotheosis of the devaluation of the other nations’ contribution to the victory over Nazism during World War II was a public remark by Putin in December 2010 about how Russians, themselves, would have won because Russia is the country of winners.

All the patterns about the Russian “victorious people” were shattered into pieces when Putin’s soldiers had to fight not side by side, but against the descendants of Kozhedub, Kovpak, and Berest. It turned out that the traditional tactics of Russian generals to “bombard the enemy with corpses” works only if there are sufficient masses of manpower drafted from among the peoples conquered by the empire.

Instead, Ukrainians, who in the past always fought bravely under Russian command, had the opportunity to demonstrate what they are capable of by fighting for their own land, people, and state. Instead of “seizing Kyiv in three days,” Russian occupiers are now forced to constantly “regroup” and make “gestures of goodwill.”

Ukrainian defense is Mariupol holding until the end; Russian defense is prematurely surrendered Kherson. The Ukrainian offensive is the blitz liberation of Balakliya and Izium. Russian offensive means countless bodies of stormtroopers in the suburbs of Bakhmut.

Fake narrative 2. “Ukrainian Army is a failure”

The Russian authorities have never been able to please their people by providing material prosperity or guaranteeing rights and freedoms. Instead, they were constantly trying to instil a sense of pride in the Russians: “everyone is afraid of us,” “everyone respects us,” “we can turn America into radioactive ash.”

Russia’s confidence in its own advantage was given to it by the army — a favourite child of the leaders and the people. Grandiose military exercises, pompous parades in the squares, boasting about the new projects of defense industry — none of this has ever disappeared from Russian TV streams.

And even though Russia has not taken prominent positions in the world ranking of economic giants, Moscow has been generous in terms of spending on its armed forces. Thus, both in the Russian and foreign expert circles, a false cliché about the “world’s second-strongest army” was quite popular.

However, the full-scale war with Ukraine clearly put the record straight. It turned out that the secret of the Russian lies about their military uniqueness lies primarily in “borrowing” Western technology, materials, and equipment. This was evidenced by trophy Russian equipment and weapons, which massively fell into the hands of Ukraine’s defenders.

Within a few months, Western sanctions on military and dual-use goods noticeably threw the Russian army back in development: its tankmen were forced to use the obsolete T-62s, and artillerymen were forced to look in the archives for manuals for D-1 howitzers (out of production since Stalin’s rule). It turned out that Stalin’s Red Army reached Berlin in 1945 thanks to lend-lease. And this time, a new lend-lease is not intended for Moscow.

The inability of the military and industrial complex to produce modern weapons led Putin to ask for missiles and drones from Iran, which itself has been living under sanctions for more than 40 years, stealing and adapting western military technology to local production.

Instead, the Armed Forces of Ukraine demonstrate impressive modernization successes, developing their own defence industry and mastering the latest innovations from Western arsenals. Javelins, Bayraktars, and HIMARS terrify enemy soldiers with their murderous precision. It is not yet allowed to speak publicly about some types of weapons and operations in which they are used.

It’s not only arsenals but also tactics that are being modernized. New management systems are being introduced, such as the Kropyva battle awareness program, which has optimized artillery targeting.

The importance of digital transformation in the army and the introduction of innovations was also stated by the Minister of Defense, Oleksii Reznikov, on December 8:  “We will be able to defeat the enemy only at the expense of the quality of our defense forces. More advanced logistics and efficient automated management system will influence the results of hostilities as much as a dozen MLR systems. It will save the lives of our warriors and bring victory closer.”

Fake narrative 3. “Ukrainian soldiers commit war crimes.”

Starting with the very first crime of this war, the crime of aggression, Russia systematically violates all conceivable norms of international law, laws and customs of war.

In the first months of the invasion, Russian soldiers gained notoriety for the Nazi-like treatment of the population of the occupied territories: the massacre in Bucha, shooting at civilian cars, a concentration camp set up in Yahidne and other torture camps, numerous cases of rape, robbery, and looting.

Russians treat prisoners of war no better than civilians. A maniac with a clerical knife does not hesitate to torture a soldier to death on camera. A barrack where the Azov Regiment POWs were held was treacherously destroyed in Olenivka.

In cities, Russians traditionally resort to shelling and bombing of residential buildings. They kill entire families in their own homes. Photos of the ruins of Mariupol, Borodianka, and Izium have circulated around the world. Russian missiles hit Ukrainians in squares (like in Vinnytsia), train stations, and shopping malls.

Civilian cars destroyed by the occupiers on the Zhytomyr highway

Since October, Russia been overtly conducting a targeted campaign to destroy critical infrastructure in order to provoke hunger, cold, and deaths.

Against this background, Russian propaganda has nothing to show in response. That is why it makes a fuss about some isolated, poorly verified cases of alleged crimes by the Ukrainian military, tries to shift responsibility for known tragedies from Russia to Ukraine, produces fakes, not shying away from provocative shelling on the territory controlled by the occupiers.

Fake narrative 4. “It is not the army fighting for Ukraine, but irregular formations, militants, nationalists, and radicals.”

The Russian army failed the blitzkrieg that Moscow had plotted, suffering painful defeats near Kyiv, Kharkiv, Mariupol, and Mykolaiv. Manpower shortage at the front and in the occupied territories was compensated in a rush. Step by step, Putin’s troops increasingly resemble motley groups, each of which is waging a war of its own.

In order to look supported, Russians announced “people’s militias” of the two pseudo-republics on the territory of the “ORDLO” their “foreign allies.” There were indeed differences. Militants from the “DPR” and “LPR,” although following Russian standards, were in reality an undermanned, poorly equipped and armed ersatz force. Russians consider them second-class troops and treat them accordingly.

Even lower in the hierarchy stand the so-called “rifle regiments of the mobilization reserve” — hastily established formations, staffed by residents of the “ORDLO,” who were nabbed during the general mobilization in the pseudo-republics. Recently, the “partially mobilized” Russians citizens have also become such disenfranchised cannon fodder.

In addition to the armed forces of the Russian Federation, the Russian Guard is also involved in the fighting, in terms of equipment being sometimes at the level of units subordinate to the Ministry of Defense. Among the Russian Guard formations, Kadyrovites are the most prominent group, effectively being a private army of the Russia-appointed head of Chechnya.

Leader of Wagner PMC Prigozhin recruits Russian convicts in prison for the war in Ukraine

A real private army is also fighting in Ukraine — mercenaries from the Wagner PMC, whose very existence and operations are beyond Russian lawsl. The recruitment base of Wagner is convicts serving sentences. They hold a whole section of the front in Ukraine, and their leader Prigozhin publicly mocks the army command — as does his ally Kadyrov.

In addition, there are various exotic formations: Cossacks, BARS, regional battalions, etc.

The occupiers lack a unified command, coordinated interaction, and simply mutual respect, a sense of unity. There are frequent cases of infighting, including lethal. In addition, the Russian army is permeated with interethnic enmity.

There is no reason to compare the Russian bestiary with the Defense Forces of Ukraine. Ukrainian soldiers maintain unity and observe subordination — despite all attempts by the Russians to oppose and pit CinC Valeriy Zaluzhnyi and President Volodymyr Zelensky against each other.

Fake narrative 5. “The Ukrainian Army is demoralized and doesn’t want to fight”

For years, Russian propaganda pumped up the population with militarism and patriotic fervor. The slogan “we can do it again,” which Russians often use while celebrating May 9 (Victory Day) always contained not only symbolic credit to WW2 veterans, but also a thinly veiled threat to Russia’s current enemies.

When the Russian leadership launched full-scale aggression, they engaged in constant attempts to convince the public that Putin had made the right choice and that the so-called “special military operation” was a fair endeavor. Soldiers are motivated either by some humanitarian mission in Ukraine or by existential threats that allegedly came from Ukraine.

One of the motivations behind participating in the aggression was monetary payments, including “post-mortem” payments to families.

Despite all this, the occupiers’ morale is low, and keeps getting lower. The war turned out to be bloodier and longer than was originally promised. The true goals of the “operation” remain a mystery for most Russians, and assurances that things are going according to plan are more sobering than inspiring.

The board of shame is one of the methods used by Russian military command to retaliate against soldiers who refused to fight in Ukraine

Applications for dismissal from the armed forces and refusal to participate in the hostilities became quite a widespread phenomenon in the Russian army. Desertion is a real scourge among the occupiers. And intercepted conversations and testimonies of prisoners vividly show the real attitudes of the Russian soldiers.

The so-called “partial mobilization” completely destroyed the unwritten social contract of the authoritarian regime with ordinary people: you don’t touch me, I don’t criticize you. And the betrayed common folk, all too happy to become the Z-patriot in front of the TV screen, started fleeing Russia en masse.

Artists, opinion leaders, and the creative class are not very enthusiastic about the war on Ukraine, either. The Putin regime is trying to resolve the motivation problems by tightening the screws, including by adopting draconian laws against anyone who disagrees with the regime or tries to avoid recruitment into the army.

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There is a common expression that the army is a reflection of society, its virtues and sins. This is also true of the two armies that met in this war, the Russian and the Ukrainian ones.

Russia is an authoritarian country, with no tradition of freedom and free political competition, or democratic rotation of power. Such a state creates a society of “small people”: socially helpless, morally hopeless, paternalistic and with a high level of tolerance of violence.

The great Russian army consists of these same “small people”. They are mostly motivated to serve in the army by stable earnings and social benefits from the state. At the same time, the state assumes all moral responsibility for the criminal orders it issues to soldiers. You don’t have to think or doubt yourself.

The relations of “small people” are based on indifference, suspicion, and hostility. This is also true of the Russian army, which has clear problems with mutual aid on the battlefield. Despite the much-hyped-up slogan “we don’t abandon our people,” Russians often do so. Russian soldiers are used to suffering brutish treatment from their command, and then releasing tension against the weaker ones.

The Ukrainian Army was reborn in conjunction with Ukraine’s powerful civil society. It happened at a moment when a mortal threat started looming over the country. Businessmen, artists, scholars, students, political activists, and other dynamic communities armed themselves — quite literally — with the Army as a tool to fight off the Russian threat.

Pro-active citizens are working hard to improve the Army from the outside (volunteers) and the inside (volunteer soldiers and young officers). Being perfectionists, they set out to perfect this useful tool. People of civilian professions and occupations invested their money, life experience, connections, skills, and ideas in the Ukrainian Army. And this is the secret of its success and effectiveness.

Center for Strategic Communication and Information Security