Week before Vilnius: what changed for Ukraine year after Madrid Summit?
Forecasts for the NATO summit vary, sometimes not quite matching Ukraine's expectations. However, there is also enough cautious optimism
There is exactly one week left until the NATO summit in Vilnius, which is scheduled for July 11-12. At the summit, Ukraine-both the government and society-wants to hear clear statements from its partners about the prospects for membership in the bloc. But will expectations be met?
Since the previous summit in Madrid, a variety of predictions have been made: From "there will be no result in Vilnius, they will repeat the old formula about the "open door", "Most likely, they will limit themselves to the already announced creation of the NATO-Ukraine Council, no more" to "Our country will be invited to membership", "There will be a joint statement by member states that Ukraine will be accepted into NATO after the war ends, and before that, our partners will offer us a temporary compromise - security guarantees similar to the Israeli model".
So what do we hope for at this point?
Dmytro Kuleba, Ukraine's chief of diplomacy, says that official Kyiv is partially satisfied with the signals coming from NATO headquarters at this stage.
"I'll speak somewhat metaphorically: when we started talking to our partners about the Vilnius summit, we insisted that they take a step toward Ukraine's NATO membership there. Today, this problem has been solved. The step will be taken. The question is how long it will be, how wide the foot will be stretched and how far it will be put," the Foreign Minister said.
Do Ukrainian and Western experts share this optimism, and how do they think the situation has changed over the past year?
Let's start with the latter.
From Madrid 2022 to Vilnius 2023: How have expectations changed?
Political analyst Ihor Reiterovych said in a commentary to Ukrinform that over the course of the year, forecasts changed frequently and in waves. After President Zelensky, Parliament Speaker Stefanchuk, and Prime Minister Shmyhal signed an application for NATO membership under the accelerated procedure on September 30, 2022, most experts began to talk about the start of the official procedure for Ukraine's accession to the Alliance during the next summit in Lithuania.
"There was also a lot of talk about the need to avoid repeating the mistakes of the Bucharest Summit in 2008, when our country [along with Georgia] did not receive the support it had hoped for. But I think that the key thing that has changed and become firmly rooted is the recognition of the fact [a kind of consensus between Ukraine and NATO] that we should not hope for a formalized accession procedure for our country until the war is over. By and large, today official Kyiv does not insist on this, but it does demand from its partners a clear schedule, a roadmap for joining the Alliance in the future - after Ukraine wins the war," the political scientist says.
According to him, the discourse on our future in the Alliance has changed significantly from Madrid to Vilnius.
"Last year in Madrid, many people still had doubts. When representatives of certain countries said on camera that Ukraine deserved to become a member of the Alliance, they said it without any specifics, believing that these words would be enough to close the topic, as they say. But the pressure from Ukraine, including public pressure, has led to the fact that today we are not talking about an unknown "open door," but about specific steps, specific dates, and specific security guarantees that we will receive until we become a member of the Alliance. Hence another important point: these guarantees cannot in any way be a substitute for our integration into NATO. Ukraine has made it clear that it will not do this, that we cannot trade one for the other, and that these should be interconnected processes. So, on the eve of Vilnius, there were dramatic changes in our favor."
According to the latest data, 21 countries unconditionally support Ukraine's integration into NATO. As for the remaining 10...
"I think they are also in favor of our country's accession, perhaps only with the exception of Hungary, whose position, I hope, will soon be of no concern to anyone. So, the rest of the countries are also in favor, but the question is only in the details, that is, it is not yet fully clear how this should happen. However, this is already a subject for negotiation. And I think such negotiations will take place at the summit in Vilnius.»
In the context of Vilnius, Ihor Reiterovych recalled the "Prigozhin mutiny." This incident, in his opinion, played into our hands. Those of the Alliance member states who still had doubts have finally begun to understand, and those who had long understood everything have only confirmed it for themselves: Russia is a failed state.
"This has shown many that Ukraine needs to be integrated faster. Because in the future there will be a serious civil conflict in Russia. And we need to be prepared for this conflict along the borders. It is clear that a significant part of this border will be defended by Ukraine, which has de facto become NATO's eastern flank."
Diplomat Vadym Triukhan reminds that there were different forecasts, both positive and not so positive.
"However, everything has changed radically in a year. If before the Madrid summit Ukraine still looked like a country that would need many years to liberate its territory from the Russian occupiers, now we are talking about a country that has proven its ability to do it much faster. Within 16 months, two counteroffensive military operations took place, which will be studied in all textbooks of military universities in most countries of the world. This refers to the "sudden", unannounced liberation of almost the entire Kharkiv region and the right bank of the Kherson region. So now, although Ukraine is not yet dictating its will from a position of strength, it is acting as a capable state that can confront powerful states, which Russia was considered to be before February 24, 2022."
Expectations in Ukrainian society have also changed over the year.
"A year ago, about 73% of Ukrainians were in favor of joining the Alliance, and now it is 85%. Over the course of the year, it has become finally clear that NATO is the only organization in the world that can guarantee Ukraine's security. We are no longer talking about whether or not we should join, and when, but about the fact that we must do so immediately after the war is over. Accordingly, the expectations from the July summit are not only to announce additional weapons, which I am sure will be discussed there, for example, to speed up the transfer of F-16 aircraft, long-range ATACMS missiles, but also to formulate the wording of the commitments that NATO will take towards Ukraine."
This has never happened before and could not happen in principle.
7 days before the NATO Summit in Lithuania: the latest forecasts
The view from Kyiv
According to Vadym Triukhan, a week before the Vilnius summit, it became clear that Ukraine's fate as to when and under what conditions it will become a NATO member is decided in one single capital, Washington.
"Even France is already in favor of Ukraine's accelerated accession to NATO, and Chancellor Scholz says that if the Americans are not against it, Germany will be too. And this is not to mention our closest partners, de facto allies, such as the Baltic States, Northern Europe, and the United Kingdom," the diplomat said. - "Now everything is in the hands of good old Biden. "And it looks like he's wavering, doubting whether it's worth making a clear commitment to Ukraine right now that it will join NATO immediately after the war is over.
This is what Mr. Triukhan believes we are approaching Vilnius with: "In recent months, various ideas have been voiced, for example, to upgrade the status of the NATO-Ukraine Commission to the status of a council. This is all good. Perhaps this will also happen. But the key thing now is President Biden's decision. If he has the courage to commit himself that Ukraine will become a member of NATO immediately after winning the war, not sometime in the future, and all other countries will follow, as they say, in the footsteps of the United States."
So the key intrigue of the last seven days is whether Washington will be able to turn the tide, whether those politicians and political circles who are hawks in relation to Russia will be able to convince the head of the White House.
"To convince him that it's time to go all-in, it's time to show Russia that no one cares about its opinion," the diplomat emphasized.
By the way, in an interview with CNN, the full version of which will be broadcast on July 5 at 19:00 Kyiv time, President Zelensky called on Joe Biden to invite Ukraine to NATO now, even if Ukraine becomes a member of the Alliance after the war. According to him, the US president is "the decision maker" on whether Ukraine will join NATO or not.
"He [Biden] supports our future in NATO, but an invitation now would be a huge motivator for Ukrainian soldiers," the President of Ukraine said.
In turn, Ihor Reiterovych hopes that at the July summit we will still receive assurances, a document that will define, first, the Euro-Atlantic future of Ukraine, and second, a specific list of steps (regarding reforms in the political, military, technical, economic spheres, etc.) that our country must take to achieve its goal of becoming a NATO member.
So, his predictions a week before Vilnius...
"I think that at this summit we will definitely receive security guarantees from several countries, such as Germany, France, the United States and the United Kingdom. These guarantees will be clearly detailed and will mostly concern military, technical and financial support for Ukraine, intelligence sharing, etc. And this will be done with an eye on our future integration into the Alliance," says Ihor Reiterovych. - "In addition, the 'surprises' that our friends from the Baltic states have been talking about were eventually mentioned by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg himself - perhaps they are related to the fact that the summit will announce that Ukraine will receive an open date for the start of integration into the Alliance. And that this "open date" will be tied to our victory."
However, he emphasizes that at the summit, Ukraine and its partners should give a specific definition of what "end of the war" means.
"We are talking about a wording that will be acceptable to our country and to all NATO member states. A wording that will not provide for any double interpretation. After all, many people do not fully understand what the end of the war is - whether it is the cessation of hostilities or the return to the 1991 border... I hope that these issues will also be discussed at the summit. And if this happens, it will also be a huge success for Ukraine, because we will know exactly what to focus on," emphasized Ihor Reiterovych.
Ilya Kusa, an expert at the Ukrainian Institute for the Future, is more skeptical: "I don't think that the NATO summit will make a decision on our accession to the Alliance. Most likely, they will limit themselves to the already announced creation of the NATO-Ukraine Council. Perhaps there will be concessions on the issue of some reforms that we need to carry out to join the Alliance."
It is possible that there will be talks about security guarantees for Ukraine. Bilateral or multilateral. This issue is currently being resolved.
"I don't think any other decisions will be made, regardless of what happens before the summit," said Kusa.
Political expert Andriy Senkiv also believes that we should not expect anything extraordinary from this summit. After all, he says, it has long been known that the position of the majority of NATO member states is to avoid a direct military clash with Russia in this conflict and a nuclear war.
"Therefore, an invitation for Ukraine to join the Alliance is possible only after the war is over. After all, a hypothetical format in which the North Atlantic Treaty does not apply to the temporarily occupied territories is unacceptable not only for Ukraine but also for NATO. The Alliance is avoiding direct involvement in the Russian-Ukrainian war, and Ukraine's legitimate actions to restore its territorial integrity would still put its protected "rear" under a non-nuclear attack, which would trigger Article 5 of the Treaty. Ukraine believes that such a format will make it impossible to liberate the temporarily occupied territories, because Russian nuclear threats are increasing precisely when Ukraine is successful, and this blackmail is a very influential factor for our partners [on whom we are critically dependent] and is effective as a deterrent to a counteroffensive," the expert shares his vision.
The key question is: what exactly will determine the end of the war? The field for discussion here is so wide that it is too early to talk about a joint approach by Ukraine and its partners.
"Most likely, in Vilnius, we will be offered several models of military-technical assistance and cooperation, which will be a long-term formalization and generalization of the assistance already provided on the basis of the UN Charter and international humanitarian law. In fact, they will not be defense and security treaties, as they will lack not only elements of deterrence, but also elements that require the direct involvement of a foreign contingent to counter aggression, including the deployment of this contingent on the territory of Ukraine. Our goal in the dialogue with NATO is not only clear to everyone, but is also enshrined in our Constitution. But, as you know, politics is the art of the possible. Let's see what we will be able to implement in practice," concludes Andriy Senkiv.
A view from the West
In an article for Politoco, translated by "Dzerkalo Tyzhnia", Wolfgang Ischinger, former chairman of the Munich Security Conference and current president of the Munich Security Conference Foundation, writes that almost everyone agrees that Ukraine's full and immediate membership in NATO is impossible while the war is ongoing, but the allies have other options.
- The first option is that the Alliance could provide Ukraine with all the practical and concrete opportunities that membership entails - from procurement and full participation in weapons programs to education, training and exercises, as well as full engagement and expertise in areas such as intelligence, communications and research - but without formal treaty membership.
"There is no good reason why, for example, Ukraine's foreign minister or ambassador to NATO should not attend all NATO Council meetings as an ordinary guest, without formal voting rights," the article says.
- Option two - although Ukraine is not a NATO member, it should be able to rely on bilateral security arrangements, especially with the United States, Canada, and individual European partners. This presupposes a long-term commitment by these partners to provide Ukraine with ongoing financial and military support. And just as the West supports Israel, the process of providing Ukraine with weapons and military equipment should be strengthened in such a way that it results in a credible deterrent.
"This approach can make Ukraine the strongest, best equipped and most experienced state in Europe in a relatively short period of time. And one day Moscow might even be happy to see the country fully integrated into NATO. Former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger recently advised that this is the argument that should be made to Moscow in favor of Ukraine's membership in NATO.
In fact, in 1990, the United States used this very argument to convince the USSR that it would be better if a united Germany became a member of the Alliance. After all, it would be less of a threat to the Soviet Union. And Moscow agreed," Mr. Ischinger writes.
- He also writes that so far, NATO countries have been "passive-active" in their response to Russia's war against Ukraine. That is, they generally reacted to Russian acts of aggression, but did not try to seize the initiative. Changing this position is the third option.
"In Vilnius, the alliance could change the situation and send a signal to the Russian leadership that, for example, from now on, any Russian shelling of civilian targets in Ukraine will result in a specific Western response: from supplies of ammunition and weapons to the supply of more advanced ballistic or long-range systems. In other words, the message from Vilnius to Moscow would be that it is up to Russia to ensure that the Ukrainian side successfully hits more military targets on its territory," Ischinger suggests.
So, which way the scales will tip, and what decisions are likely to be made at the NATO summit in Vilnius, is still up for debate. But we hope that these decisions will bring Ukraine closer to NATO membership.
Myroslav Liskovych. Kyiv