How Russia uses protests by relatives of POWs in information warfare

Unable to overcome Ukraine’s resistance on the battlefield, Russia is increasingly focusing on information and psychological pressure on Ukrainians. In 2025, the Kremlin’s propaganda budget will rise by 13% to a record $1.4 billion.

The majority of these resources will be directed at destabilising Western countries; however, Ukraine remains Moscow’s top priority. The enemy has long abandoned hope of imposing the pseudo-values of the “Russian world” on Ukrainians and instead aims to fracture Ukraine from within. To achieve this, Russian special services are trying to manipulate Ukraine’s internal agenda, aggravate tensions, and sow discord and distrust.

Mechanics of manipulation

Among the most sensitive issues for Ukraine are the release of prisoners of war. Moscow is well aware of how much Kyiv wants to bring home its defenders, and that is why they are doing cynical information and psychological operations (psyops), a combination of informational elements and complex on-the-ground operations. One such attempt to destabilize Ukrainian society occurred on January 14, 2023. That day is remembered not only because a Russian missile struck a residential building in Dnipro, killing 46 people, including six children. It was also the day when a protest was held in Kyiv by relatives of Ukrainian soldiers who had gone missing or held in captivity. The primary demand of the protest, directed at the Ukrainian government, was an exchange based on the ‘all-for-all’ formula.

There can be no doubt about the sincere desire of people to see their loved ones return from captivity. However, Russian special services are working extensively to turn these feelings against Ukraine. From the very beginning of the full-scale war, the enemy began creating fake social media pages for Defence Forces combat units, along with various groups where “unofficial truth” about frontline events and unit conditions is posted on behalf of Ukrainian soldiers. Dozens of Telegram channels are also operating, disguising themselves as Ukrainian sources and spreading fake and provocative messages.

Such sources, by the Russian special services, were responsible for the “information pumping” before the demonstration on 14 January and immediately afterwards. Here is an example of publications that appeared in the fake telegram channel of the 81st Separate Airmobile Brigade:

Screenshots from the fake Telegram-channel of the 81st Separate Airmobile Brigade (t.me/oaembr81)

Attentive readers might have noticed that the information about the demonstration, attended by around 200 people, was illustrated with a photo from Euromaidan. They might also have been puzzled by the strange wording about the “learning” of the fighters—a typical error from automatic translation from Russian to Ukrainian. The Euromaidan photo was likely used to intensify the psychological impact or convince the audience that a massive demonstration had taken to the streets of the capital.

Paying attention to the narrative promoted by Russian special services is essential. This narrative suggests that “commanders” and the “authorities” have supposedly abandoned prisoners and are doing nothing for their release, even hiding critical information from their relatives. Thus, it implies the only option left for families is to protest against both the “authorities” and the “commanders.” This is a classic tactic of wartime propaganda. In this way, the aggressor seeks to convince Ukrainians that their main enemy is in Kyiv, not in Moscow. Here, this tactic targets a specific social group—the relatives of prisoners and missing persons, whom the enemy tries to exploit for its own purposes.

To deepen the victim’s sense of despair, Russia cancelled a prisoner exchange scheduled for January 14, 2023, without providing any reasons. This is a clear example of the Kremlin’s dirty and cynical blackmail tactics.

In the Crooked Mirror of Propaganda

Since then, Russia has continued to exploit rallies of relatives of prisoners of war and missing persons in its own propaganda. An example of this is the rally held in Kyiv on October 16, 2024.

Rally in Kyiv, October 16, 2024. Photo: Suspilne Kyiv/Anastasia Isayenkova

The protesters demanded that relevant agencies provide more information about prisoners of war and missing military personnel, and they submitted an appeal to a representative of the Office of the President. Let’s look at how Russian propaganda used this public action.

Let’s start with the general data. According to monitoring by the Center for Strategic Communications and Information Security, messages about the demonstration became a “hit” for Russian propaganda between October 16 and 17. This isn’t surprising, as a coordinated information operation took place, involving 108 disinformation sources that published 122 pieces on this topic, reaching an audience of 1.29 million.

Disinformation was most actively spread through Telegram channels, as this messenger is the most popular in Ukraine and serves as a direct entry point for Russian propaganda into the Ukrainian audience.

The last table should be clear: a significant portion of Russian propaganda resources disguise those that broadcast from Ukraine or other countries. In this way, Russian intelligence services try to deceive as many Ukrainians as possible by hiding the true origin of the disinformation. This is a typical propaganda tactic, as evidenced by Center for Strategic Communications studies.

Screenshots from propaganda telegram channels, collage

What messages and narratives were promoted as part of this information operation?

• “Ukrainians are gathering on Maidan against Zelenskyy”;
• “Ukrainians no longer want to fight”;
• “Security forces are blocking widows driven to despair”;
• “The government is waging war to the last Ukrainian”;
• “The Ukrainian Armed Forces are suffering catastrophic losses,” and so on.

The mention of the “Maidan of Widows” echoes the previous operation of the Russian special services, “Maidan-3“, which Moscow tried to implement in the spring of this year. The operation, as we know, failed: Ukrainians did not question the legitimacy of President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and did not turn out for a “third Maidan” as the Kremlin wanted. However, Russian propaganda seeks to present any protest or peaceful public actions taking place in Ukraine as the beginning of mass unrest that will lead to the collapse of the Zelenskyy regime. This is to create a feeling among Ukrainians that the country is on the brink, that the resource of its internal unity has been exhausted, and that the state leadership is about to lose control of the situation. Consequently, the propaganda assures it is necessary to accept the Kremlin’s terms as soon as possible and sign the surrender.

As for the relatives of prisoners of war and missing persons, Russian intelligence services are pursuing a dual strategy. Firstly, Moscow is avoiding the ‘all-for-all’ exchange in every possible way, although President Zelenskyy has advocated such an initiative since 2022. Moreover, the Russians are deliberately obstructing the exchange process and tormenting prisoners of war. This is done primarily to create maximum tension in Ukrainian society, especially among the families and friends of captured defenders. This is how Russian special services seek to use people disoriented by fake news and driven to despair to undermine the Ukrainian home front.

Furthermore, the manipulative and deceptive portrayal of such actions is aimed at undermining the resilience of Ukrainian society. Observing these protests through the lens of propaganda, one might conclude that serving in the Armed Forces of Ukraine is a “one-way ticket”; that the state has abandoned both its defenders and their families, that further resistance to the aggressor only increases the number of victims, but the war will ultimately end in Ukraine’s defeat, and so on. It is clear that these are the very sentiments that Moscow seeks to spread within our society.

The realities of information warfare

Moreover, the demonstration on October 16 coincided with President Zelenskyy’s presentation of Ukraine’s Victory Plan in the Verkhovna Rada. This coincidence, unsurprisingly, caught the attention of Russian propagandists. They spun the narrative that while Zelenskyy was presenting his “unrealistic” plan, Ukrainian women were allegedly protesting against the government and demanding an end to the war. Manipulation? Absolutely. Russia is waging an information war against Ukraine, ignoring any rules or conventions. The enemy aims to disorient and demoralise our society and undermine its resilience in resisting aggression.

Therefore, the Center for Strategic Communications urges citizens to trust only verified information sources and not fall prey to enemy manipulations. Russian special services employ not only basic propaganda techniques but also more insidious methods. They may collect data on the relatives of prisoners of war, spread fake messages on behalf of our defenders, and carry out targeted informational attacks on the circles of their relatives and close ones (mainly through groups on social platforms). The Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War calls for vigilance and urges citizens not to allow the enemy to disrupt the activities of public organisations and initiatives that, in one way or another, are concerned with the fate of prisoners of war.