Taras Kachka, Ukraine’s Trade Envoy to the EU

Ukraine’s export-import trade turnover exceeded USD 52 billion for the first half of this year, according to statistics from the State Customs Service. This being said, imports far exceeded exports, valued at USD 33 billion vs USD 19.5 billion.

According to Deputy Ukrainian Minister of Economy -- Trade Envoy to the European Union, Taras Kachka, this situation was hard to avoid, given the ongoing war. The country's export  capacities are limited due to the destruction of factories by the enemy and logistical problems, this at the time where there is a significant requirement for imported supplies, particularly where it comes to critical imports needed to support our economy. But this notwithstanding, Ukraine is gradually restoring its export capacities, primarily in the agricultural sector, but also in the sectors of metallurgy and machine building.

Read more about this and about the outlooks for Ukraine's integration into EU markets in an interview Ukrinform had with Taras Kachka.

RESTORATION OF AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS: PRE-WAR LEVEL IN VOLUME BUT NOT IN VALUE

- Mr. Taras, the value of products imported to Ukraine over the first half of the year almost doubled the volume of the country’s foreign currency revenues. Ukraine is replenishing its budget due to the taxation of imports on the one hand, but on the other, the need for foreign currency to pay for imported supplies exerts a significant pressure on our foreign currency market and reserves. What are the outlooks to improve this situation and reduce the trade deficit?

- Our export-import trade situation has stabilized, and logistics has been set up in place. Ukraine sells what it can sell and buys everything it needs. Looks like a kind of theoretical formula, but it explains the absence of any significant actual problems. As you know, with the beginning of the large-scale war, our foreign trade effectively came to a halt due to the disastrous situation in logistics, particularly because the enemy was blockading our seaports.

Now the ports of Great Odesa are working, there is a rhythmic supply of goods by road and railway across the country’s western borders. In terms of physical export volumes, we have reached the pre-war level. This means to say that the capacity to export nearly all Ukrainian products has been restored, albeit with certain nuances. Cereals and other bulk cargoes are easier to export, but it is more difficult with container shipping, which is for the time being focused mainly on rail and trucks, with cargoes delivered to foreign ports, such as Constanta in Romania or the Baltic and North Sea ports. Therefore, some difficulties with logistics remain in place, but basically, Ukrainian exports are sustainable.

In value terms, however, the result is still much worse than it was before the war. In the first half of the year, we exported USD 19.5 billion worth of various goods and products, which is quite a low level. The negative factors of the first years of the war, which had a significant impact on prices, in particular, for cereals, are still visible, not only globally, but also locally: I mean low purchase prices within the country. For that reason, the situation with foreign currency revenues is not the best at this point.

Instead, Ukraine imported USD 33 billion worth of goods and products over the first half of the year. In other words, every month we spend USD 2 billion more on imports than we earn on export supplies. For me as the country’s trade representative to the EU, this is a very bad story. It is vital that the trade is balanced so that we trade a lot outside Ukraine, but not at a loss.

On the other hand, if we look at the top five most imported product, we see that these are primarily fuel products: diesel, gasoline, other fuels that are almost not produced in our country, pharmaceutical products, used vehicles, which very often go to the frontline, as well as UAVs. So, this year, for the first time, drones made it to the top five imported products. There are also significant imports of components for assembling UAVs and other equipment in Ukraine. It is clear that now the country cannot do without such imports. This situation is fully objective.

But, of course, this gap between imports and exports creates great pressure both on the foreign currency market and on macro-financial stability in the country as a whole. This is a direct impact of the war, which, unfortunately, cannot be avoided. Therefore, it matters that we focus on developing domestic production and increasing exports in the future. After all, we, in fact, are able to export everything  we can. The markets are there, and we therefore need to produce more and more.

- Are you expecting any changes in the price situation in the short term? Should we expect that Ukrainian exports of agri-food products and metallurgical products will grow in profitability? After all, our metallurgy sector, despite the problems arising from the destruction of enterprises and power supply shortage, is gradually recovering.

- In fact, there is developing a favorable situation with respect to grain prices. But one must appreciate that the situation is not bad when compared to what is was like previously. After all, in 2022, exporters were in despair: due to stalled logistics, prices on the international and domestic markets differed by four times; domestic market prices for cereals intended for export were sometimes lower than the cost price. Therefore, compared to those times, we are currently experiencing a pretty significant growth. A contributory factor behind this was the normalization of trade and a reduction in the "weight" of logistics, which used to account for the lion's share of the export price in 2022. Now the cost of transshipment is being brought back to normal, logistics costs are decreasing. Accordingly, the price becomes more appealing to farm businesses.

Also, the formation of prices for various products is influenced by factors related to possible crop failures both in our country and in other regions of the world. Abnormal high temperatures had had a detrimental effect on some crops, and to some extent positive on others. Basically, the harvest of the main export crops in Ukraine, according to 2024 forecasts, will reach last year’s level. But in certain segments, a significant reduction cannot be avoided. It is obvious that the impact of high temperatures on corn will be more adverse, because the heat wave period coincided with the time of corn flowering. Same will probably be with soy and sunflower. However, the impact of such weather on wheat is ambiguous. In some regions, the scorching sun caused damage, fields burnt in sun. But on the other hand, lower air humidity during harvesting time always has a positive effect on grain quality. And with high quality, you can ask for a higher price.

Another story of extreme importance is the restoration of the metallurgical sector. In 2022, metallurgical production fell by three quarters year-on-year. Now we see a ten percent or even higher production growth rate for individual product groups. Anyway, there is significant market globally for Ukrainian metallurgical products. The map of sales is worldwide, reaching as far as remote markets in North America.

Our machine building sector remains to be sustainable. Exports of processed foods have decreased compared to 2021, but are gradually growing.

- Incidentally, what are our expectations regarding a shift in exports in favor of products with a high added value? On the one hand, it is quite difficult to set up deep processing plants on a large scale amid war, but on the other, the government is encouraging  a shift toward processing; the opening of some credit lines is conditioned by a commitment to use the loaned funds for building new processing lines.

- In this context, we encounter two noteworthy trends. The first is about how the lessons learnt from the blockade of logistics routes and the government's emphasis on the development of processing industries are changing the approaches used by our producers. The second is a change in the worldview of the business itself. Such trends existed even before the war: domestic processing industries were gradually growing and developing. In particular, against the backdrop of millions of tons of wheat exports, an increase in flour exports by just a few tens of thousands of tons seems unimpressive. But in fact, this amounts to an increase of a dozen percent compared to even the pre-war time. It is also important that such exports are mainly for Europe, for wealthier markets with better prices. And that is why our export/import statistics show that exports of value-added products are growing at a significantly higher rate than the basic commodities.

Undoubtedly, exports of unprocessed farm produce will be significant for a long time to come. After all, these are tens of millions of tons of produce, which are impossible to exceed with processed produce within a short time. Plus, there is a significant market worldwide for unprocessed produce. Some individual markets are focused on this only. For example, the global trend now is to sell livestock by live weight, rather than in prepackaged chilled or frozen beef. Our interest is to increase exports of pre-cut and processed beef. These two trends are working on parallel tracks. This does not mean talk should be about difficulties, but, rather, about the need for a market research and choosing the right priorities in terms of what is more profitable to export and where to, what can bring more money.

Basically, as I’ve mentioned above, the focus remains to be on increasing the proportion of value-added products in our export structure. I think that, in the short-term, there will be a lot of news about industrial collaborations between our machine building companies and their counterparts in the EU, there will be more orders for parts and assembly supplies from Ukraine, for the assembly of finished products from European-made components in Ukraine. This is facilitated by both the process of integration into the EU  market and our industries’ willingness to change. We see that, by participating in exhibitions, in business missions abroad, communicating with potential international partners, our businesses are learning lessons about which components are better to produce, what can be of interest to foreigners.  And then they quite actively modernize their production capacities to bring them in line with new needs.

A deeper involvement in production chains with the European Union companies is now a key trend. That makes them convinced that the share of processed products with high added value will only grow. But that being said, we must encourage the export of everything possible that we produce in this country, especially where it comes to our traditional exports, while avoiding artificial restrictions on exports of primary products.

UKRAINE AND THE EUROPEAN MARKET: HOW TO EVENTUALLY OVERCOME LACK OF "EXPORT-RELATED UNDERSTANDING" WITH NEIGHBORS

- You are emphasizing quite understandable things: Ukraine is oriented towards the large, rich European market. But just like everything else, this also has problems. In this regard, the past year and the start of this year were very difficult. You participated in negotiations with European partners regarding cross-border issues in relations with our immediate neighbors. What is the main lesson Ukraine has learned from this situation? How will this experience be useful in the trade part of negotiations on Ukraine's accession to the EU?

- The main lesson is that, in order to get fully integrated into the market, to be present in it at all times, it is necessary to use the available opportunities with maximum wisdom. Ukrainian producers and exporters alike could not but behave like they did in 2022, when we were saving ourselves and the whole world at the time where all traditional routes for Ukrainian food exports were blockaded. Indeed, a lot of our grain exports had to be transshipped via Poland back then, which distorted that country’s customs statistics. So, even a tiny political spark could trigger protests. And the context of parliamentary elections in Poland contributed to spreading political debates on that topic.

It goes without saying that, had we behaved like this in peacetime, it would be reckless, indeed. On the other hand, under conditions of ongoing war, an increase in shipments through this route, northern Europe, was probably the only way out for us as exporters and for consumers who were waiting for our products.

In peacetime, when you can trade more predictably, it will obviously be necessary to allow time for both us and neighboring countries to get accustomed to each other. But this is only the local context of our neighboring countries. The European Union is a much wider and more complex market. For example, the phase of evolutionary "getting accustomed to" has already been passed through by southern Europe, in particular, Spain. The market for Ukrainian cereals out there is huge and sustainable. This is of need and value to both countries. Because this is effective trade over the Mediterranean Sea, an effective use of the Ukrainian fodder base by Spain. Exports reach millions of tons. Basically, Spain and Italy account for the lion's share of cereals exports from Ukraine to the EU. This is good news, meaning that systematic, comprehensive, and extensive trade with the European Union is possible even in very sensitive segments such as agricultural produce.

Alternatively, the example of countries - our neighbors - shows that excessively drastic changes, changes that are not discussed, can cause problems. That said, a challenge facing us now is what we are already deeply engaged in – which is negotiating with associations, businesses, market players in neighboring countries all the aspects of trade: what we produce, according to which standards, and where we want to export our products to. And the longer and in more detail we talk about it, the better and easier it will be for them to understand us, Ukrainians. To understand that we pose no threat, that we are really good at trading, but we do not abuse this opportunity, neither do we do any harm to local producers anywhere. After all, Ukrainians are actually very flexible: we are always looking for alternative markets, we understand that we, being a mighty agrarian country, are treated with particular attention. But that being said, we are ready and willing to expound and search for compromises, be it the sugar market, or the markets for poultry meat or honey. We are open to discussions in search of solutions to issues in all domains, to prove that these issues have no relation to Ukrainians or Ukrainian products. That is what will help remove part of existing issues from the agenda.

After all, there should be talk that, initially, there were 40 partially liberalized agricultural products covered by the Association Agreement. Now, as part of Autonomous Trade Measures (ATMs), there are reservations regarding as few as seven product groups that are considered sensitive. Moreover, in each of these seven product groups, the situation can improve regarding the access to the EU market for our exporters. And this will be of benefit for the European Union itself, for its industrial and end consumers alike. After all, sugar, for example, is a help to European confectionery producers; it will soften inflation in the EU, for rhythmic supplies will be contributive to price stabilization for this product. And there should be consistent effort made to make our partners convinced of this. The situation should be made as clear as possible to all stakeholders in the process, and then it will be possible to avoid protests arising. This goes for all and every product group that will come under our negotiations with the EU and with individual neighboring countries.

- Regarding the extension of the Free Trade Agreement, with the simultaneous enforcement of certain restrictions on the sensitive products you’ve mentioned, Ukraine had exhausted its EU export quotas for two agricultural product groups, and nearly exhausted quotas for a few more product groups already in June after relevant regulations came into force. What to do with this? Maybe arrange for increasing the quotas for specific products or something else?

- First and foremost, the situation regarding the ATMs is controlled to the maximum, it is calm and stable. We knew that for some products, such as oats, for example, Ukraine had exceeded the export quota prescribed by the autonomous trade measures several months before the agreement had been endorsed by the European Union. Therefore, the quota situation with respect to this crop was obviously clear.

Furthermore, we halted trade in sugar: we were the first to ban it, followed by the European Union. From the point of view of free international trade or trade law, these moves are not entirely appropriate on both sides. But this is what is needed to establish trust between markets. The fact is that Ukraine had never exported sugar to the European Union market previously. In 2021, for example, we exported 7,000 tons, even did not fully exhaust the quota assigned. Why? Because the sugar refining industry in Ukraine actually worked for the needs of the domestic market only. Once we had 170 sugar refineries, now there are only 32 of them left. And all of them experienced not the best times of market restructuring and shrinking, inability to export, etc. In the meantime, our European neighbors were experiencing similar disturbances catalyzed by the European Union itself: people were paid for leaving the business, were encouraged to close sugar refineries.

Now we have got back to exactly the same situation: an efficient market for refined sugar in Ukraine and an efficient market for refined sugar in the EU. This status quo arose for various reasons. Whereas in our country it was a painful transformation arising from a lack of markets, financing problems and others, in the EU it was the pressure exerted on the industry with the help of money, influence from the authorities. And now it turned out that, nominally, Ukraine has significantly increased its sugar exports to the European Union. Exports jumped up from 7,000 tons to 500,000. But it was not an expansion into the EU market, but, rather, satisfaction of market demand, a compensation for the shortage in the European sugar market. But at the same time, having a market disturbed by transformations in the EU and a market disturbed by transformations in Ukraine, we get that nervous reaction to our exports.

Now, having exported what was allowed and within the limits of the quotas assigned, Ukraine has suspended trade in sugar. We are preparing to get it re-started from January 1, when the opportunity to export in large volumes will open again. Hopefully, the trade will be better organized, be more predictable. And the export ban - a pre-emptive measure  - allows us to mitigate discontent on the part of our partners (in fact, European rivals) in these markets.

We have also fully exhausted our export quotas for eggs, but we can use the WTO quota at a reduced duty of 15 euros. I think that these Ukrainian products will continue to be exported to Europe. This will prove that Ukrainian agricultural products are in demand in the EU market even with the customs duties in place. And this will give us reason to say during EU accession talks: we are not seeking to expand into your markets, but want the systemic imbalances existing in the EU’s agri-food markets to be overcome, first and foremost, with the help of exports from Ukraine.

- What are your expectations regarding the possibility for Ukraine to trade in selected products such as corn, for example, without limitations set, given that export quotas for seven product groups affected by Autonomous Trade Measures (ATMs) will be fully exhausted in the coming months?

- Regarding corn, the outlooks are really good. For the time being, there is a zero duty on corn exports to the EU. Therefore, even when the upper limit set out by the ATMs is reached, this is not going to cause any harm to Ukraine, trade will be continued on duty-free terms. But I am expecting that we will come closer to the upper limit without exceeding it.

We introduced licensing for trade in poultry meat in order to avoid an intense "battle" between our producers, because Ukrainian exporters of this produce to the EU market are increasing in numbers: whereas we were talking about one systemic exporter, now there are about ten of them. This makes us hope that it will not come as far as to customs trade even in the event the quota is exhausted.

We are expecting the quota’s upper limit will be reached this fall. Let's see what the EU’s decision will be like.  What matters most in this context is that our market knows of how much each of the producers can export, as this helps avoid unwelcome disturbances in the market. What matter also is to ensure stability of supplies to the EU market.

- I know that Ukrainian honey has always been well selling to the EU market, even with quotas in place…

- With respect to honey, we have a paradoxical situation. This is yet another illustrative example proving that excessive politicization of the agrarian market discourse brings about solutions that are absolutely paradoxical. The fact is that we reduced our honey exports the European Union last year, because with honey, we cannot export more than we can export physically. So, despite we reduced our honey exports, the Europeans decided to impose a quota limit. But we know that since 2014, when the Free Trade Agreement on exports to the European Union became operational (even unilaterally), the exhaustion of the quota never stopped the export of this product; our producers paid a 17 percent duty and exported it to Europe with profit for themselves. If anything, it will be like that now.

That being said, our challenge is to reduce the heat of political discourse as much as possible, to explain that each of these products that the Europeans consider sensitive for themselves has its own unique history of our presence in the EU market. And this history usually rests on multiyear cooperation with European buyers. These are mostly business buyers, processing businesses who make good money from produce grown in Ukraine. My conviction is that during such a calm, informed dialogue, it quickly becomes clear that Ukraine's full integration into the European agricultural market meets the best interests of all of Europe, let alone poses a threat.

- What matters most in our EU accession talks when it comes to trade in agricultural produce? What should we change in the short term, what should we implement? And what should Europe change, because the urgency of changes to the Common Agricultural Policy is being discussed in the EU, and Ukraine's potential accession will inevitably catalyze changes for European farmers?

- In that matter, everything is simple and complicated both at the same time. We fully realize that Ukraine will have to implement all European food safety standards. And we are following this path, which is part of our commitments under the Association Agreement. Sometimes something is easier to do, something is more difficult, but we are following this path. With regard to the Common Agricultural Policy, the question is not about what should be changed in the policy in order to "absorb" Ukraine, but about the European Union’s vision of its future agricultural policy. Reasonably enough, what was relevant for them in 2004 is no longer relevant now, because the Common Agricultural Policy regulations have been updated twice already. In the past, 20-25 years ago, these markets used to be strictly regulated in terms of how much milk one can produce, how many eggs, something else... The agricultural production was strictly planned. It is now liberal, but at the same time it is increasingly pressured by climate policy regulations.

The EU comprehends the inevitability of its agrarian policy evolution, and this is irrespective of whether Ukraine will be accepted into the EU membership or not. Technically, these changes are expected from 2027, and we are talking with European colleagues about long-term modeling. We should discuss and agree on the goals to be pursued by the European Union’s agricultural policy, and how Ukraine can help achieve these goals within the currently existing model of agriculture – resilient to all odds, viable and capable of doing without significant subsidies from government. To put it briefly, we are discussing how we can be helpful to the European Union, and where it can and should help us.

We are not going to race for aid subsidies and still more aid subsidies. In Europe, unfortunately, some want to see us just like that, expecting that we’ll greedily demand: give us a billion, one more billion, and another billion... This kind of behavior is typically characteristic of those who shun competition. But our behavior is completely different. We are saying: let's jointly define the goals we want to achieve, say, by 2050, and find out how we can help each other in this effort. Because in Ukraine, there are many successful industries that are in no need of subsidies. But we, just like the Europeans, are still needing subsidies to facilitate the development of small-scale farming, organic food production, for achieving some of the climate policy objectives, for some other things.

Having said that, our country's participation in achieving a common goal will facilitate this process; the implementation of relevant policy goals with our help will be less financially burdensome for European taxpayers than it is now, because Ukraine can really bring a lot of useful things to Europe.

- With respect to integrating the capacities and capabilities of the European Union as an exporter on the one hand, with the capacities and capabilities of Ukraine as a potent agricultural product exporter on the other --   where can we complement each other in order to become stronger players in global markets?

- Even now, we do not compete too much with each other, but are, rather, partners. Take, for example, Ukraine's cooperation with Romania in the Black Sea. We act harmoniously as partners in flexible markets such as the grain market. Thanks to mutual support, we maintain a strong common position that the entire Region takes heed. We hold a similar potential for synergy with other EU countries and with the European Union as a whole. By joining efforts with our agricultural sector, the EU has the potential to eventually evolve into the most dominant player in the global agricultural market. Alternatively, having potent partners such as the current EU member states will come as a reinforcement to Ukraine’s agricultural sector.

It should be kept in mind that Ukrainian agriculture is actually European agriculture -- not only in terms of the rules followed, but also in terms of the technologies used. Genetic materials for breeding chickens, selection for dairy cattle breeding, dairy machinery - very often these are all European technologies, European know-how in agriculture. In other words, it is critical for us that this kind of integration and this kind of mutual exchange be maintained and strengthened in the future.

RESTORING TRADE WITH OTHER REGIONS: HOPE FOR THE BLACK SEA TRADE CORRIDOR

- What about the other supply routes from Ukraine, both for agricultural and metallurgical products and others? How does the restoration of maritime trade corridors affect export volumes?

- The Middle East and North Africa region is the second most important market for us after the EU. Due to the blockade of the Black Sea at the beginning of the war, some restrictions arose in this region. But now we are regaining what we have lost, slowly restoring our positions in the Egyptian and Turkish markets. Last year, Ukraine entered the Algerian wheat market. This is also a good sign, as our presence in this market has been only intermittent so far.

Due to the war and logistical issues in 2022, lots of traders from the United Arab Emirates turned away and stopped working with Ukraine, but now trade is returning bak on track. Plus, we expect a free trade agreement with the United Arab Emirates to be signed this year.

At the same time, sunflower oil exports to India have reached pre-war levels.

“Indonesia is also slowly “opening up”, we are returning to that country’s wheat market. Also, even in 2022, when sea routes were blockaded, we, thanks to the Grain Initiative, were able to gain a significant share of the Chinese corn market. A quarter of China’s corn imports come from Ukraine. China’s share in our exports is now approaching six percent. These are mainly agricultural food products. And with sustainable navigation, our presence in these markets will increase.

At the same time, we never forget about our humanitarian mission. President Volodymyr Zelensky's Grain from Ukraine initiative to supply food to poor African countries has become sort of a "second space speed" for the initiatives being implemented under the aegis of the United Nations. We did not invent new mechanisms, but arranged for a fundraising campaign, amassed quite a lot of money to pay for seven large aid packages and several more shipments of processed foods and ready meals to areas on the verge of humanitarian catastrophe.

For Somalia, for example, 50,000 tons of Ukrainian wheat is an extremely large aid, given the country’s yearly consumption of 700,000 tons. In other words, the delivery of 50,000 tons means that the entire country can eat normally for nearly two months.

It is obvious to everyone: where people are on the verge of starvation, they need to be provided with foods here and now. But the world needs to have a global food delivery system that would preclude situations where people face imminent starvation. And that's why markets need to work properly. In Africa alone, 32 countries depend on wheat exports from over the Black Sea - either from Ukraine, Romania, or Russia. The latter, however, is showing itself to be an increasingly inhuman trading partner, limiting and reducing supplies every year. Despite all the efforts to destroy and steal Ukrainian harvest, the production of both wheat and sunflower in the Russian Federation is declining. Fewer and fewer people are ready to cooperate with Russia as a reliable trade partner.

So, it’s vital for us to expand the reach of trade from Ukraine, to increase and improve partnership with Romania, and holistically to create an integrated trading space in the Black Sea region. That is why we need a free trade agreement with Turkey. When and if we get it ratified, all the Black Sea countries, excluding Russia, will be integrated into a single system of rules of origin, with a single common certificate of origin. This means more reliable and robust supply chains, better understanding, and this will contribute to improving the situation with regard to ensuring sustainable food supplies to Africa and Southeast Asia. That is our long-term goal.

We see that Ukraine’s business community is in need of such an agreement. At one time, many of my friends, parliament members, business colleagues were wary of the possibility of such an agreement being signed, citing potential risks for the Ukrainian side. These concerns are all accounted for in the draft  agreement that is now "on the table", potential risks are reduced to the minimum. The finalization of the agreements is a matter of the coming weeks.

- What other good news regarding our export/import trade can be expected in the near future? And where are the potential risks to Ukraine?

- It must be appreciated that there has been a slow-down in the development of agreements with third countries since the time Ukraine started EU integration. But this year we will probably update our trade agreements with Norway, Switzerland and Iceland, as well as member countries of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). Signed a decade and a half ago, the EFTA Agreement needs to be updated, particularly with regard to providing a greater access to markets, more specifically agricultural markets. We need to update the agreement with Montenegro, as we did with North Macedonia, as well as with other Balkan countries. We are planning for negotiations with the Mediterranean countries, including maybe with Tunisia. Lebanon, too, has an interest in cooperation with Ukraine.

These things may not be groundbreaking, but they finalize the huge project of creating a trading space in the Mediterranean Sea region that will be as open as possible to exports from Ukraine.

We also continue a dialogue with the Pacific region within the context of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) agreement. Even in the process of consultations, we can identify bilateral projects of common interest. Thus, we found out that Ukraine could have an interest in updating the agreement on mutual protection of investments with Japan to add a trade component, because trade takes place both through export-import and through the presence of legal entities in each other's territory. By the end of the year, we are going to see quite a lot of such "non-global", at first glance, but important, consistent moves. Because our strategy of gradual improvement of access to all key markets for us continues to be in effect.

So, what matters most is for us to preserve the security situation we have in the Black Sea now thanks to our Defense Forces, to improve it as much as possible. And the biggest threat is quite obvious: it is Russia, who seeks to physically destroy products, places of production, logistics hubs. And the better we are protected, the easier it will be for us to increase exports.

Interviewed by Vladyslav Obukh, Kyiv

Photo Credit: Hennadiy Minchenko