The NATO summit is currently underway in Washington, attended, among others, by a Ukrainian delegation led by President Volodymyr Zelensky.
In an Ukrinform interview, Janusz Onyszkiewicz, a former Minister of National Defense of Poland was speaking about his expectations from the summit, Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic integration prospects and the current situation on the Ukrainian battlefield.
RUTTE WILL UNEQUIVOCALLY SUPPORT UKRAINE; TRUMP IS A “BIG MYSTERY”
- Mr. Minister, the outgoing Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte is set to take over as NATO Secretary General from Jens Stoltenberg. What’s your opinion about what this means for our part of Europe, for Ukraine?
- This is good news, which means the continuation of the current NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg's line, particularly with respect to Ukraine. Rutte is a politician from a very pro-NATO country, so his election is a good step. He will definitely support Ukraine in the defensive war it is waging and will work to make ensure all Member countries are supporting Ukraine.
- Will Mr. Rutte be able to find an understanding with Donald Trump if he is re-elected as U.S. president?
- It is difficult to say, because Trump is a big mystery. As a matter of fact, if anyone in the US says they know how Trump would act if re-elected as president, it's hardly true. Trump is unpredictable, but people who used to be members of his entourage, as well as his current or potential advisers have quite different views. Some are saying that the US should pressurize Ukraine into giving up its plan to get back its areas currently occupied by Russia and into coming to terms with the current situation. Others, instead, are arguing for the need for further support for Ukraine, among them former National Security Advisor to the US President O'Brien, as he wrote in a recent article for Foreign Affairs. But this support, in his opinion, should mainly fall on the shoulders of the Europeans. If the latter prevails among Donald Trump's people, then the situation is not as bad as everyone fears.
THE NATO COMMAND STRUCTURE TAKES NO ACCOUNT OF NEW REALITIES
- What decisions can Ukraine expect from the NATO summit?
- It should be remembered that NATO as an organization has neither a budget nor material resources of its own. The Alliance's capabilities are pretty modest, limited to AWACS long-range radar detection aircraft and pipeline infrastructure. Therefore, decisions on providing financial support or military equipment to Ukraine are supposed to be made by each individual Ally. Of course, calls for the Alliance as a whole to increase aid to Kyiv may be heard at the summit.
At Washington, boosting the capabilities of NATO on its eastern flank, as well as a reform of the Alliance's command structure, particularly a redeployment of certain command centers to other locations should be central topics for discussion. In other words, we are talking about a departure from the current organizational structure in NATO, which was configured for a time when the Organization was not facing a war threat. At that time, the Alliance’s missions were mainly expeditionary. It carried out stabilization missions or crisis response operations, so there was no such confrontation like a large-scale classic war. The current NATO command structure takes no account of the new realities. Some individual command centers should be redeployed towards the east, and the rank of military representatives from the eastern flank Allies in these centers should be increased.
- Given the current situation, as well as your experience, when you as the Minister of National Defense brought Poland into NATO, do you see Ukraine in the Alliance? What’s the historical perspective like?
- This is a problematic issue. Everything will depend on when Ukraine will be ready to bring to a halt the active phase of the war. NATO will not dare to accept a country waging a hot war on its territory, because this war would inevitably become a war for all of the Alliance. Therefore, there will be no political agreement among NATO countries, at least some of them. In NATO, all decisions are required to be made by consensus.
On the other hand, Ukraine can be accepted into NATO if it agrees in some way to freeze hostilities along a certain line. Furthermore, Kyiv must accept that it won’t be possible for it to regain control over its currently occupied areas as a result of a war it may go to in the future. In a certain way, this situation would be similar to the circumstances of the FRG’s accession to NATO (in 1955, - ed.), as it was accepted into the Alliance while in a territorial dispute with the GDR. West Germany then had to make a clear commitment to other NATO Members that the only way the unification with East Germany will happen will be by peaceful means.
Indeed, the best option for Ukraine would be to join NATO after its territorial integrity is reinstated. But we don't know when that will happen.
UKRAINE'S USE OF F-16’S COULD UNDERMINE RUSSIA'S MILITARY INFRASTRUCTURE
- Allies will provide Ukraine with additional air defense systems, and the US has recently permitted strikes against military targets in Russian areas bordering on Ukraine. What’s your assessment of these developments?
- This is a right but a bit delayed step. Lots of such decisions should have been made way earlier. Ukraine, however, is empowered to attack targets deep in Russian territory with its made weapons or weapons provided by Allies, including the United Kingdom or France. It’s my hope that the US will soon expand the area permissible for Ukrainian strikes, because the 100 kilometer limit is insufficient as it allows the Russian army to operate in strategic depth across an area which needs to be made reachable for Ukrainian missiles. I think that this area should be expanded to 300 kilometers.
- What’s your assessment of the current situation on the Ukrainian battlefield?
- The so-called Kharkiv offensive by the Russian army has failed, which is a success for the Ukrainian army. The current situation on the Ukrainian battlefield is reminiscent of the World War I, with a stable front line. I am not expecting that the Russians will try opening new fronts on the northern axis, using for this the territory of Belarus, for example. If this is the case, the issue of striking Russian targets in Belarus would emerge on the agenda.
- Ukraine is expected to start using the F-16 fighters soon. How will this impact on the frontline situation?
- This can entail a further degradation of all of Russia’s military infrastructure. It is also a clear signal to Moscow that this is not a war being waged somewhere far away on the territory of another state, but a war where targets inside Russia are coming under attack. On top of that, this can impact on militaristic sentiments among the Russian society. The Russian propaganda is currently creating an atmosphere of total militarism in the country. But truth to be told, this doesn't cost the Russians anything, because they don't suffer from the war as much as the Ukrainians do. An increase in the number of strikes deep into Russia - against military targets, oil refineries or critical infrastructures – will make the Russians realize that this war is being waged on their territory, too.
Russia is a large country, and the destruction or damage of a few power plants will not cause a significant crisis in its energy system. However, the continuation and expansion of the geography of Ukrainian strikes against targets inside Russia will expectedly bring to the consciousness of ordinary Russians that this war affects them immediately.
The Kremlin, for its part, should realize that Russia will not prevail in this war. The Kremlin's absurd hopes that Ukrainians would be grateful to them "for the liberation of Ukraine from the Nazi regime" have proved futile. After all, Russia has always used such methods: when the Red Army invaded Poland in 1920, they, as in Ukraine now, claimed they were fighting not with the Poles, but with the "Polish nobility that enslaved the Polish people." This is a Russian standard.
Interviewed by Yuriy Banakhevych, Warsaw
Headline photo Via chaprter97.org