The NATO summit, an anniversary event that generated great interest, is history now. The political outcomes are clear to us: Ukraine's membership in the Alliance is not on the current agenda; we will be invited if and when there is a consensus and Ukraine is ready, but only after it wins. 

It matters that the talk should not only be about the political components, but about what the NATO summit gives us in terms of our win as a key prerequisite for future membership. Ukrinform met with Oleksandr Hara, an international and security policy expert at the Center for Defense Strategies, to discuss the outcomes of the NATO Washington Summit.

President Zelenskyi said ahead of the summit that we have 14 new brigades, but they are underarmed, understaffed, have nothing to fight with, but we need these forces if we are to advance and win. Does the summit give us reason to hope that, from now on, everything will go faster, and weapons will arrive more rhythmically and to where they are supposed to arrive?

- Let's hope that will be the case. To begin with, I would like to speak about what we and our partners lack; this is about a strategy. The plans and strategies that we had last year, unfortunately, have never been implemented, and now our partners are pretty pessimistic about our army’s ability to liberate the parts of Ukraine that are currently occupied by Russia. This being said, the main challenge is to help the Ukrainian defense forces in such a way that the adversary cannot advance further on the one hand and to help the Ukrainian military amass sufficient forces and capabilities to enable future advances on the other. So what to do in the future in a situation where there are no responses either from the country’s political leadership or the military command? This is discouraging our partners from being fully engaged in providing us with the capabilities we need. This problem remains unsettled, people are working on it, but so far there has been no explicit strategy to address this. Indeed, there is a Peace Formula, there is a political formula for Ukraine’s win. This includes the liberation of all the Ukrainian territories currently illegally occupied by the Russian Federation; the achievement of justice, punishing the perpetrators for the crime of aggression, for war crimes against humanity, for the acts of genocide committed on the territory of Ukraine, as well as a compensation for the losses and damages they have incurred, and, of course, Ukraine’s NATO membership as the only available  guarantee for long-term security for Ukraine. This is all reasonable, but in order to get there, we need a victory or the collapse of the invading forces, so that we can begin liberating our territory with less effort. And this is the strategy that needs to be worked on.

And what happened in Washington is very important: firstly, all programs, projects, aid priorities were organized into a certain logical structure. And it is very positive for us that these structures are aimed into the future, and the Ukraine Compact (Compact) was signed. By and large, this is a three-point statement: the first point deals with helping Ukraine now, the second with planning and helping Ukraine create future forces; and the third is about our partners’ commitments regarding their actions on how they will behave in the event of a new attack on Ukraine, that is, after the war is over.

- The third point is about a “future” attack, not “new”, meaning they are not expecting such attacks will be numerous, but the risk of an attack in the future is still not ruled out.

- Yes, indeed, but if we look into our history, Yury Dolgoruky was the first; the first war between Moscow and Kiev occurred many centuries ago. And we very well understand that as long as the Russian Federation remains existing within its current borders, and considering that a significant majority of the population in Russia share the views of their political elite, they will pose a threat, firstly, to themselves, secondly, to their neighbors, and, thirdly, to all of the world, given their nuclear weapons potential. That being said, I, of course, would like this to be the last war with Russia. Let there be lots of little russias that will be unable to amass resources and commit crimes against us. But I am more of a realist on that matter and don’t believe that the Russian issue will be able to be solved soon. That’s why the Ukraine Compact outlines the core principles of support for Ukraine.

Next, an entity is being created within NATO, which is effectively taking over the role currently performed by the United States. This is about the Ramstein Format and other mechanisms of assistance to Ukraine. This is done solely in order to secure the aid and these entities from Trump’s possible return. It is indisputable that the United States, and most particularly Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, have played an extremely important role. Mr Austin represents not only the greatest economic, military, and industrial power, but, using the power of his charisma and authority, very often inspired more conservative and inert partners to give more aid [to Ukraine] in terms of both quantity and diversity.

Will the Ukrainian defense forces be provided with everything they need? I hope so; the start of F-16 fighter planes’ transfer to Ukraine has already been announced. This is extremely important in that it provides us with a means to secure our skies, most particularly over cities and, also, over our defense forces at the frontline. Because it is clear that our lack of combat aircraft is exploited to the full by the Russian invaders. According to various mass media reports, the adversary uses some three hundred fighter-bomber airplanes every day to kill us and our soldiers. And it is clear that we need an adequate capability to contain this threat.

- Indeed, a lack of a strategic vision, the need for a clearer vision of the future - this will all happen later. But the war is ongoing now and every day; help is needed continuously at the frontline. In this regard, I think it’s noteworthy that the summit was preceded by a defense technology forum in Washington. And what we saw in Europe, the intentions announced by Ursula von der Leyen to boost EU’s own defense industrial capacity, the same is also happening in the United States. This is an important trend, and an understanding is coming that money doesn’t decide everything. The money is there, but ammunition is not. The European Union promised a million projectiles last year, but they haven't arrived yet. The President of the Czech Republic announced an ammunition initiative for Ukraine in February, partners have raised the money, but ammunition deliveries have not yet arrived because surplus is not that easy to find. So, this forum, von der Leyen's plans to establish the office of European Union commissioner for defense and to send such a EU representative to Kyiv -- what this all will give us and when are we going to see the result?

- Yes, this war revealed that the West has relaxed in the idea that, after 1991, Europe could be the scene of an all-out war of that intensity and scope. Certain processes were taking place, which now have to be reversed: the consolidation of large corporations, disappearance of small and medium-sized companies resulted in a reduced capacity to manufacture large quantities of products, ranging from rounds of ammunition to many other things. They are currently trying to invest in the development of their manufacturing, R&D and testing capabilities. But in addition to money, this takes time and extremely knowledgeable staff; this is a time process.

Merkel once said she expected the Minsk agreements would buy Ukraine time to get prepared and deter Russia. But this, frankly, is a lie, since neither Germany nor Obama’s administration gave Ukraine a single cartridge, let alone the equipment that would allow us to develop our defense-industrial sector. This has changed now, but this, needless to say, takes time. Our partners, primarily the United Kingdom, clearly saw the threat coming from Russia back in 2014 and began assisting us to rebuild our Naval Force. Let me remind you that the UK was the first country to provide us with manned systems, first tanks, first cruise missiles and much more, including in terms of technology cooperation.

Now we see that the United States is ready as well; we have signed a bilateral security agreement, which contains a provision of paramount significance to us regarding the development of the Ukrainian defense industrial complex. The problem with the Americans is that they have large corporations that effectively monopolize such cooperation, but what we need are technology platforms, both large and small, that would give us an edge.

The first weapons co-production deal has recently been signed with an American corporation, which heralds a very positive development. The willingness is there, the understanding of what is needed is there, too, and there is an understanding of where the bottlenecks are. But it is good that our partners in the United Kingdom, the United States and some other countries have readily available product samples, or components, or technologies that have been trialed and tested. What remains for us to do is to build, like a Lego constructor, what we need for those tasks, for those capabilities that we need.

And, needless to say, we have to make more weapons domestically in Ukraine, and there is one simple reason for this. One of the hottest issues in negotiations between Zelensky and Biden was about permitting Ukraine to use Western (not only US) supplied weapons to go after legitimate military targets on Russian soil. After all, we know that partners are following the strategic framework set by the Americans. Another issue is getting an access to advanced technologies and components at the time Russia continues using them against us. And, just a month ago, there were heavy restrictive measures slapped on Russia by the United States. The situation is still far from perfect, indeed, and further work needs to be done.

And that is why developing Ukraine’s defense industrial capacity and capability is a vital necessity in terms of becoming independent of policies pursued by one or more countries and securing our national interests within the context of Article 51 of the UN Charter, which gives us the right to self-defense.

- Ahead of the [NATO] summit, just on the day the Defense Technologies Forum was in session, Ukroboronprom launched its representative office in Washington. Oleksandr Kamyshin, Ukraine’s Minister for Strategic Industries, said: "We are doing this because we have a consistent strategy for developing partnerships with Western partners and Western industries." This is a positive contributive step towards getting these contacts up and running. However, as you know, the defense industrial sector in the United States of America is not unified, there is no such thing like Ukroboronprom [government-owned arms manufacturing group] out there. American partners are more inclined towards direct ties and contacts with specific manufacturers, rather than with intermediary entities. That said, how effective will this move be?

- Let's see. I agree that the Americans have a completely different system. In fact, these are civilian corporations that have weapons products in their portfolios. Of course, the US export of arms and technology is subject to export control restrictions. That’s on the one hand. Secondly, and very importantly, this comprises a part of the US international policy, and they can introduce certain restrictions. In Ukraine, there were attempts to do so; we, too, have a national export control system in place. But even so, there is need for entities that would deal with this and understand the requirements for technology, equipment or armaments, and especially so in the context of the security agreements signed. Because each of the agreements Ukraine has signed with two dozen countries so far incorporates provisions on assistance in the development of the Ukrainian defense-industrial sector, technology cooperation, etc. We need some kind of a hub that would know what partners have got to offer us and on what terms, and what the actual requirement is. In other words, the Armed Forces act as the customer and the industry as the contractor, so it would be nice to have such a hub in place. A certain State entity, such as the Office of the National Security and Defense Council, I think is perhaps best suited for this role, being an entity that deals with strategic policy matters, operates under the President of Ukraine and have the competence to coordinate this cooperation.

- But we have the Ministry for Strategic Industries, and they seem to have all the cards in their hands: projects, plans, developed products...

-- Where the Compact includes assistance in creating future forces, for instance, it is a matter to be dealt with by the military, while the economic component is a matter for the Cabinet of Ministers. There are, for example, issues relating to certain individual technologies, and that is where different government agencies can be involved. On top of that, there are individual officials who are in charge of supervising the production of drones and other technologies, and that as well requires a regulation. Next, there are chapters on safeguarding intellectual property rights, information security, etc. Basically, the government agencies dealing with economic issues, given their limited functional capacities, are unable to embrace all these issues. So there has to be in place some entity dedicated specifically to that job. I would like this to be a kind of “task force” (working group, - ed.), comprised of departmental officials with responsibilities in relevant fields, but vested with certain powers. It takes an operator to reconcile the overall political and military strategies, develop doctrines, understand what kind of forces will be needed in the future, what the industrial strategy will be like. Next there will be need to create something akin to Amazon. There is a NATO Amazon, where one can search out for the required products -- equipment, armaments and more – and just choose from the availability list. The same should be with us, so that manufacturers are able to communicate their requirements and use that entity to gain an access to our partners. So it would be great if such a hub entity was in place; and Ukroboronprom will hopefully prove itself capable of this task.

- There is something to do, there is a vision, and we have a defense industrial sector that has already gone far beyond the scope of government-owned enterprises. It is also telling that private initiatives and private businesses are playing an increasingly visible and systemic role. This is important precisely in the context of the future forces and building up a modern army.

Let's get back to NATO and allied aid. Ahead of the NATO summit, the White House published a draft of a joint declaration on its official website. The leaders of the United States of America, the Netherlands, Germany, Italy, and Romania announced the transfer of five strategic air defense systems, as well as dozens of tactical air defense systems to Ukraine. President Zelensky, speaking at a defense ministerial meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Council, requested seven (not five) Patriot air defense systems for Ukraine. Nearly half a year has passed, but the announcement came only now, and the Patriots have not yet been deployed in our country.

- I couldn’t agree more, especially given that only one out of the five Patriot systems promised to us will be donated by the United States, the news of which wasn’t released till the day the gathering opened. And we perfectly understand that similar aid packages are being brought together adapted for various scenarios, and various statements and documents are being drawn up and signed. Indeed, it is better for us to have in place these assets instead of nice statements of intention. This may be due to the six-month delay in Congress’ vote on the Ukraine aid bill. Secondly, these systems are not readily available in a store where one can come and buy them at any time: something is under production, something is given to us by partners, with the costs being compensated by the Americans or someone else. Because it’s only reasonable that each country is guided by own national interests first, and only then, being NATO members, they are guided by the interests of collective security, followed by the interests of partners like Ukraine.

I would be happy indeed to see those systems already operational; they would save our lives, and tactical systems would certainly have a pivotal role to play on the battlefield, but we have what we have. There is another thing worth considering: when it comes to the United States, this involves a pretty lengthy procedure – placing an order and procuring something, awarding a contract that can take up to a year to conclude, because everything needs to be meticulously elaborated and written out in detail. And, actually, during the public part of NATO meetings, industrialists were talking about how to get this mitigated, to bring certain things into line so as not to waste too much time, how to provide a certain degree of flexibility. Incidentally, ensuring uniformity and harmonization comprises another challenge that needs to be addressed. It is no longer a secret: certain projectile types, for instance, are incompatible with particular types of howitzers, and they gave serious thought to making these fully compatible.

On a side note, we are currently working on a new technology project that was developed under a Private Finance Initiative with no government funding involved, but with support from the Ministry of Defense. This is about a system named Delta, which gives a picture of the battlefield and has already proved itself very well. There are several other innovations that are even better than those developed by corporations in the United States.

For that matter, it is not yet conceptually clear how Ukraine, even with all the 40 billion in aid to be provided to us at least for 2025, will be able to build up a defense force robust enough to deter the greatest nuclear threat in the future. In other words, how can we build this force within this limited strategy and with limited resources, without nuclear weapons, or without short-to-medium-range missile capability in place?

- And without NATO membership?

- Yes, unconditional membership in NATO is the only security guarantee available to us, because NATO is protected with nuclear umbrella of the United States, as well as UK and France. And until we have someone who guarantees our security, with nuclear weapons or with an arsenal on a par with that of the Russian Federation, deterrence will not work. Sure, we may be better and more armed, but that won't deter Putin from attacking us next time. While on the subject, there is one more decision of importance to us. The United States has recently decided to get its Tomahawks and state-of-the-art hypersonic missiles deployed on German soil by 2027, thus responding to the Russian Federation's violation of the Treaty on Short- and Medium-Range Missiles. Trump at one time withdrew from that treaty, and in addition, the Russian Federation deployed its tactical nuclear weapons on the territory of Belarus.

- Such a decision will definitely have far-reaching consequences, but again, that will happen sometime later. You’ve mentioned warplanes, and State Secretary Blinken announced at the summit that the fighter planes donated by the Netherlands and Denmark are already on the way to Ukraine. Patriot air defense systems, warplanes are on the way, but we know that these planes will reach our airspace by the end of summer at the earliest. You also mentioned 40 billion dollars; this amount is prescribed in NATO documents for the next year. However, it is written there between the lines that this is the average amount of aid given to us by our allies during the previous years of war. It also does not specify it will be NATO money. Rather, it will be the money allocated on a bilateral basis by our partners, in accordance with bilateral agreements, and in proportion to their means and commitments. NATO, as written in the decision, should receive reports every six months on who spent and how much. Therefore, the question is: what about NATO? Air defense systems were provided by five countries, warplanes will come from two countries, money is provided by our partners on a bilateral basis, the Ukraine Compact was signed not with NATO, but with all others who have signed security agreements with Ukraine. So, may it be that the Ukraine Compact is, in fact, a prototype for a future NATO?

- The future of NATO is an interesting topic to discuss. The factor of Trump is, shall we say so, heavy, and there are discussions ongoing, primarily in France and UK, about how they can guarantee nuclear deterrence of the Russian Federation if Trump takes a different approach. Indeed, Trump cannot withdraw from NATO, because Congress has made a safeguard that makes such a decision impossible unless endorsed by Congress. But he can well reduce his commitments, have fewer or no troops, or remove weapons. Just two weeks ago, Politico published an article that quotes Trump’s advisers as saying all NATO allies will be subdivided into two categories depending on the percentage of GDP they spend on defense, warning that countries spending less than two percent will not be eligible for protection. This is an extremely dangerous idea, in that it means divided security.

- Business models in security and defense are dangerous, too..

- That doesn't work, especially because Moscow and other capitals take this to mind, and they will certainly be looking for ways to use this division to their advantage. But let's take Estonia, for instance, a small country that spends 3.4%, and, despite its small size, is helping Ukraine more than the United States in relation to percentage of GDP (1.63% and 0.34% of GDP, respectively). And let's imagine that the Russians invade that country (a 2016 report by RAND Corporation says that it will take just two days for the Russian Federation to invade and occupy all of the three Baltic States). Indeed, these countries felt a little bit encouraged by the Vilnius summit, and they revised their plans. The previous plan was like this: the Russians invade, NATO is making preparations and then liberates the occupied territories. But after seeing Mariupol, Bucha, Irpin and many other cities, towns and villages in Ukraine, they decided this scenario would be better addressed preemptively, and updated their plans. Plus, of course, Finland and Sweden in NATO contributed to security, as the arms supply channels and communication lines would be protected, meaning the Baltic countries can basically feel more or less safe.

But Trump can say: why would I start the Third World War over petty country like Estonia that I can't even find on the map; let's better come to an agreement with Putin and then move over to other things. Therefore, this factor remains in place, and serious discussions are ongoing within NATO.

As for why this is happening, why NATO as an alliance is not involved in supporting Ukraine. There are several meaningful considerations that should be taken to mind. First, and most important, is the strategic framework, where the Americans determined that Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine gives us the right to self-defense, and the United States and its allies are helping Ukraine without being a party to the conflict. And this well explains why we did not receive a single cartridge, projectile, tank or aircraft from NATO. And the fact that NATO is now trying to take over the format of cooperation with Ukraine from the USA is just a response to the potential return of Trump.

- The Americans are in no hurry to give this format up to NATO; there have already been statements made, and for some reason I am inclined to trust these statements, that the Ukraine Defense Contact Group (Ramstein group) will continue working as it is now, and let's hope that this work will proceed faster. We will wait and see whether this will be the case. I want to believe that decisions will be implemented quickly, and most importantly, that our Armed Forces will soon see the results of the decisions our partners have taken. We have reliable partners, we have commitments, we have agreements, we are on our way to victory.

- Glory to Ukraine!

-  Heroes of Glory!

Interviewed by Ihor Dolgov

Photo Credit: Yevhen Kotenko

The full video of the interview is available on Ukrinform’s YouTube channel here