ISW: Russian army does not have enough resources to continue intensified offensive

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) think tank said this in a new report, according to Ukrinform.

The report notes that Russian forces have recently made notable tactical gains but have not demonstrated a capacity to seize operationally significant objectives. ISW distinguishes between tactical gains, which are relevant at the tactical level of war in the near vicinity of the fighting, and operational gains, which are significant at the operational level of war and affect large sectors of the entire frontline.

ISW analysts believe that the Russian seizure of Vuhledar will not on its own radically change the operational situation in western Donetsk region, however, and Russian forces will likely struggle to achieve their operational objectives in the area during the ongoing offensive operation in western Donetsk region.

"Russian offensive operations that are pursuing operationally significant objectives, like the Russian effort to seize Chasiv Yar or to push Ukrainian forces off the left (east) bank of the Oskil River, have either stalled or are resulting in particularly gradual gains over long stretches of time, respectively," the report reads.

According to ISW analysts, the Russian military command prepared the ongoing Russian summer 2024 offensive operation for months in advance and accumulated operational reserves and resources for the operation that the recent months of attritional fighting have likely heavily degraded.

Russian forces reportedly aimed to establish a new operational grouping of forces with uncommitted operational reserves of up to 70,000 personnel for the offensive operation into northern Kharkiv region in May 2024 while also establishing operational reserves for the Central Grouping of Forces' push to Pokrovsk this summer. Russian forces have likely expended a good portion of these reserves on the stalling offensive operation into northern Kharkiv region, the intensified offensive tempo in the Pokrovsk direction and western Donetsk region, and the response to the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk region.

Russian forces also continue to suffer heavy armored vehicle losses in large, unsuccessful mechanized assaults throughout the frontline, particularly in western Donetsk region. ISW predicts that Russian forces likely accumulated a large amount of equipment for such mechanized assaults, but significant medium- to long-term constraints on Russian armored vehicle stocks will become more salient as losses grow and may force the Russian military command to rethink the benefit of continuing such intensified mechanized activity in Ukraine. Continued heavy Russian attrition in Donetsk Oblast and further Russian redeployments to Kursk Oblast will weaken Russia's ability to sustain offensive operations in northeastern and eastern Ukraine, although Russian forces are more likely to continue decreasing offensive activity on lower-priority sectors of the front than to do so equally along the entire frontline.

According to the ISW report, the current Russian summer 2024 offensive operation "will likely culminate in the coming weeks and months," but Russian forces may nevertheless continue to conduct offensive operations at a much lower tempo throughout Ukraine in hopes that consistent offensive pressure would prevent Ukrainian forces from accumulating the manpower and resources needed to contest the theater-wide initiative.