Three countries attempted to interfere in the US presidential elections: an overview of the main threats

Three countries attempted to interfere in the US presidential elections: an overview of the main threats

Ukrinform
According to the conclusions of the U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the main threat to election interference came from China, Iran, and Russia.

Each of these countries followed its own strategy, each with its own characteristics. They all actively utilised generative artificial intelligence’s capabilities to create disinformation content.

Various methods were also used to conceal the true origin of this content, which was disseminated through real individuals, inauthentic social media accounts, fake websites, and more.

In the Strategic Communications Centre’s monitoring report, read a more detailed analysis of the actions taken by each of these states, with a focus on Russia’s most active interference efforts and forecasts on further developments.

MAIN SOURCES OF THREAT

China’s first attempts to influence the US election race were recorded in the spring of 2024. In April, it was revealed that Beijing was behind in creating fake social media accounts that spread conspiracy theories, fuelled internal conflicts, and criticized President Joe Biden.

The Iranian hacker group APT42, linked to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, hacked the email accounts of 12 individuals involved in the election campaigns of Joe Biden and Donald Trump in May and June.

Russia’s influence campaign has been effective since 2022. Information operations aimed at discrediting President Joe Biden and the Democratic Party were a constant part of Moscow’s efforts to undermine support for Ukraine. As the elections approached, Russia launched its most aggressive and large-scale campaign to interfere in the U.S. elections.

FEATURES OF THE STRATEGY AND MAIN NARRATIVES

China’s efforts were not focused on directly influencing the outcome of the elections. Chinese information influence actors sought to strengthen their position by attempting to shift perceptions of China and amplify divisions within American society on issues such as drug use, immigration, abortion, and more. Politically, China spread narratives aimed at discrediting the democratic system. As the elections approached, China concentrated on discrediting specific American politicians who took a strong stance against the People’s Republic of China.

Iran’s strategy primarily focused on sowing distrust in U.S. political institutions. In an attempt to increase polarisation in American society, Iran chose the conflict between Israel and the Gaza Strip as a key topic.

Russia’s strategy also included attempts to undermine confidence in democratic institutions and the electoral process, as well as to exacerbate internal socio-political divisions in the United States. However, Russia aggressively supported one of the candidates (Donald Trump) and made significant efforts to discredit his opponents (Joe Biden and Kamala Harris).

All interference actors actively used the capabilities of generative artificial intelligence to create disinformation content. They also used various methods to conceal the true origin of this content, which was disseminated through real people, inauthentic social media accounts, fake web pages, etc.

METHODS OF RUSSIAN INFLUENCE ON THE US ELECTIONS

According to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the biggest threat regarding election interference was identified as Russia.

This conclusion is confirmed by the scale of Russia’s disinformation campaign and the variety of means used in its implementation.

To spread disinformation in the U.S., Moscow actively engaged American influencers who broadcasted propaganda narratives and disseminated fake content from within the country.

The latter include not only individual bloggers and public figures, but also the media company Tenet Media, which systematically spread pro-Russian and anti-Trump narratives.

Russia launched a wide-ranging international disinformation campaign called “Doppelganger,” initiated by Putin’s administration head, Sergey Kiriyenko. Russian organisations such as the Social Design Agency (SDA), Structura National Technology, and ANO Dialog implemented the campaign directly. The primary method of the campaign was disseminating fake messages through dozens of fake websites that mimicked the design of popular media outlets (Fox News, Washington Post, etc.).

Russian propaganda widely produced and spread fake text messages, video and audio recordings that discredited candidate Kamala Harris and members of her team. The spread of these fakes was accompanied by the promotion of conspiracy theories, as well as content aimed at sowing racial divisions and other conflicts within American society. As Election Day approached, Russian propaganda efforts focused on states that were wavering between supporting Donald Trump and Kamala Harris.

Russia also resorted to provocations aimed at directly disrupting the electoral process. On November 5, election day, dozens of polling stations in several states received bomb threats. According to the FBI’s findings, some of these messages were received from Russia.

CONCLUSIONS:

Despite the conclusion of voting, the threat from external actors remains. China, Iran, and especially Russia, could use Donald Trump’s victory to provoke divisions in American society, protests and violence, and a political crisis. The period of increased risk will last until the day of the US President’s inauguration on 20 January 2025.

The White House’s policy towards Ukraine will remain a priority topic for Russian disinformation in the United States. No evidence suggests that Moscow will stop promoting anti-Ukrainian narratives in 2025 or beyond. Moscow’s goal is to discredit Ukraine in the eyes of American society to undermine the US resolve to provide military support to Kyiv.

Given the scale of Russia’s attempts to influence the outcome of elections in the U.S., it can be expected that Moscow will try to maintain a high intensity of disinformation for as long as possible.

Center for Strategic Communication and Information Security

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